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1. Introduction 
 
The Cohesion Policy designed by the European Union has been contributing actively to 
the achievement of sustainable economic growth in European regions over the last 
decades. The recent political and economic developments in the EU may justify the 
revision of some of the principles driving the Cohesion Policy so as it can perform its 
duty with equal success in the coming years. One of the main challenges to tackle, 
which is already taking place, is the transition of the Cohesion Policy to the new 
European Union after the more recent enlargements of the Union, which have leaded to 
a larger and, in particular, more heterogeneous, field of application of the policy. The 
recent economic crisis, will, in addition, put more pressure on the consolidation of the 
public budget in all levels of the public administration in the coming years. In this 
scenario, the effective functioning of the tools that form the Cohesion Policy becomes 
crucial for its sustainability in the long run.  
 
One of the aspects that must be put into consideration, and the issue covered in this 
paper, is the role that the different levels of fiscal decentralization achieved in every 
Member State have on the mechanisms ruling the Cohesion Policy. In particular, we 
will study the programs design under the Structural Actions1 that pursue the increase of 
public investment on key areas for growth. We will, therefore, focus our attention in 
these policies whose purpose is enhancing Public Investment, and will try to evaluate 
whether the level of fiscal decentralization of the member states play a role in their 
effectiveness. 
 
Both issues, Fiscal decentralization and EU intergovernmental grants, have been 
addressed separately in numerous empirical studies. In most of the cases the focus of the 
studies has been centred in estimating the effect of these policies on economic growth. 
Only very recently, some researches have put their attention on the impact on the 
distribution of public expenditures. But, to our knowledge, there is no previous work 
trying to address the importance of the simultaneous effect of both policies.  
  
Economic theory has also traditionally modelled the issues of fiscal decentralization and 
effectiveness of intergovernmental grants separately. Nevertheless, very recent 
developments of economic theory in the field of intergovernmental grants have 
identified the role of fiscal autonomy of granted government in the efficiency of the 
grants. Results, if not totally contradictory, are not coincident among the few studies.  
 
Volden (2007), for example, develops a model based on a game, solved through 
subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction, in which elected politicians in a 
national and subnational governments compete with each other to claim credit for 
providing goods and services in a given policy area. He finds that the effect of grants 
depends on the capacity of the recipient government to efficiently raise taxes. 
Governments with greater tax-efficiency2 would experience higher crowding-out 
                                                          
1 In the nomenclature of the European Union, the term “Structural Funds” usually refer to the four Funds 
conforming the so-called Regional Policy (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, FIFG) while the “Structural Actions” 
include, in addition, the Cohesion Fund. In this paper, we will use both terms indistinctively. 
2 Defining tax-efficiency as the capacity that the subsidized government has to efficiently raise taxes. One 
could think that this variable may be closely linked to the level of fiscal autonomy.  
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induced by the grant, meaning that the grant becomes less effective in enhancing public 
expenditure in a particular policy area3.  
 
Kappeller (2007), uses a model with three tiers of government and matching-grants 
designed to promote public investment that compensate the externalities of re-
distribution policies. While the model in Volden (2007) is more general and the grant is 
assumed to be attached to any policy area, this one suits better the case of the European 
Cohesion Policy since matching-grants are intended to promote public investment. He 
finds, instead, that the granted governments would under-invest when tax-autonomy is 
restricted, particularly in rich regions. In this case, the level of the matching-grants 
devoted from the medium to the lower level of the administration is also suboptimal.  
 
Economic theory probably needs of further empirical studies identifying stylized facts 
over which build assumptions and develop richer models. But also the public 
administrations and the society in general, need of better instruments to judge the results 
of the several policies taken over. Based on the declared target that the Structural 
Actions –exclusive of the ESF- are intended to promote Public Investment in key areas 
for growth, this paper tries to show that the effectiveness of these policies will depend 
on the level of fiscal decentralization of the country or region of application. Being this 
the case, the policy implication yield by this result would include taking into account 
the different levels of fiscal federalism achieved in the Member States in the rules 
governing the Structural Actions. The one-size-fits-all strategy, that has given 
reasonably good results in the past, may be improved in order to serve a larger and more 
heterogeneous European Union in a new scenario in which, most likely, taught 
constrains in the public budget are going to remain for years after the crisis is overcome. 
 
Spanish regions are, probably, the better example of the development on both policies 
over the past few years. Spain have, simultaneously, experienced an important 
decentralization process as well as benefited greatly of the Cohesion Policies run 
through the Structural Actions. Both processes have been asymmetric and independent: 
asymmetric because while fiscal federalism has affected differently in time and degree 
the several Spanish regions, the allocation of Structural Action shows also important 
differences across regions; and independent, because both policies are completely 
unrelated, since there is no economical, social or geographical aspects running the 
processes of decentralization. Therefore, the stronger effect of the Structural Actions 
devoted to poorer regions affect, equally, to regions with high or low level of fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the main facts and 
figures describing fiscal decentralization and Structural Funds in Spain, Section 3 
present the data and variables, Section 4 describes the methodology and the results, and 
Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda (2005) link the causality in the other direction, stating that economies 
with a higher “flypaper effect” (expenditure response to an intergovernmental grant) would have a lower 
optimal level of tax-decentralization.  
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2. Fiscal Decentralization and Regional policy in Spain 
 
We focus our empirical analysis to the period 1993-20074. There are some studies that 
examine more carefully the process of fiscal decentralization in Spain and the 
introduction of the Structural Actions in the Spanish regional economy5. In this section, 
we introduce the main figures governing the dynamics of fiscal policy in Spain in this 
period, in particular, with respect to the two issues that attain this paper: fiscal 
decentralization and the Structural Actions. 
 
The recent process of decentralization of public financing in Spain starts with the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978. The Constitution set the bases for the ulterior 
establishment of the seventeen regional bodies, defined as “Autonomous Communities”, 
which are the main beneficiaries of the decentralization process. As will see later in 
more detail, the level of competencies assumed by each regional government and the 
pace at which these competencies are assumed is not homogeneous among all regions.  
 
The constitution of the regional governments finished in 19836. The regional 
governments are considered NUTS 2 by the European Commission, using its own 
nomenclature.   
 
 
 
         Figure 1: Shares of Public Expenditure by level of administration 
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                      Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Although the first allocation of the Structural Funds in their current structure started in 1989, our sample 
begins in 1993 due to the lack of homogeneous series of allocation of the Funds, at the regional level for 
Spain 
5 See for example Molero, 2001 for an impact of decentralization on the fiscal scheme in Spain, and 
Pardo García (2003) for the Structural Funds. In González-Alegre (2008) both problems are also 
introduced more extensively.  
6 Although later, in 1995, were constituted the Statutes of the two Autonomous cities, Ceuta and Melilla. 
These have been excluded from our analysis due to data availability.  
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Simultaneously to this process of political adaptation to the new Constitution, occurred 
the most important increase of public spending. Total public spending moved from 
representing less than thirty percent of GDP in the late seventies to lay around fifty 
percent in the last years. Figure 1 shows how the main beneficiary of the 
decentralization in the last years has been the regional sector. Local public expenditure 
has only increased its share over total expenditure 2 percentage points in thirteen years, 
while the regional level has increased to over 30% of total public expenditure in 2008, 
compared to 1995 when it represented around 17 %. 
  
Figure 2 shows the share of non-central government expenditure to total public 
expenditure in several countries. The process of decentralization that Spain has suffered 
is not a general pattern of behaviour of the countries in its economic environment. The 
level of this ratio has risen in the recent years to reach a situation comparable to federal 
countries like Germany.  
 
 
          Figure 2: Ratio of state and local public expenditure to general government   
          expenditure. 1995 2007.  
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The behaviour of public investment in Spain does not seem to correspond, either, to an 
international trend. If we consider the consolidated public sector, the level of public 
investment in Spain has growth slightly in the last two decades, in contrast to most of 
the countries on its economic environment. Public investment –expressed as of 
percentage over GDP or total public expenditure- is, in general, higher in those 
economies with a lower per capita income. But for the case of Spain, even in per capita 
Euro, the raise of Public investment has been remarkable in comparison to other 
economies in the EU, as shown in Figure 3: 
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 Figure 3: The Evolution of Public Investment. 
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As we have briefly mentioned before, the level of competencies of every region is not 
identical. Each region has its own Statute of Autonomy that defines the activities in 
which the regional government is competent to legislate and govern. In fact, the Spanish 
Constitution discriminates between two types of regions: the first one is the so-called 
"historic nationalities" or regions with a high level of competencies. These regions are 
described in the article 143 of the Spanish Constitution7.  
 
The second group consists of the ten remaining regions8 (and the two autonomous 
cities) that in principle assume a lower level of competencies, and are described in the 
article 151 of the Spanish Constitution.  In practice, the regions with high levels of 
competencies experienced a higher level of decentralization in the beginning, but the 
differences have been reduced as long as the decentralization process has been taking 
place.  
 
We can observe this phenomenon if we build a ratio of fiscal decentralization as the 
coefficient between per capita expenditure at the regional level to the per capita 
expenditure at the central level. The average evolution of this indicator in both groups 
of regions (with high and with low level of competencies) is shown in Figure 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Comunidad Valenciana.  
8Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile La-Mancha, Castile and Leon, Comunidad de 
Madrid, Extremadura, Murcia and La Rioja.  
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 Figure 4: Decentralization Ratio. Ratio of per capita public expenditure of the regional    
 government to the per capita public expenditure of the central government (excluding  
 social security).  
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 Source: Badespe and “Liquidación del presupuesto de las CC AA” 
 
 
 
This ratio formed as a coefficient of per capita public expenditures between the regional 
and central government may present some weaknesses. The main shortcoming may be 
the fact that the coefficient depends on expenditure policies run by the central 
government9.  However, for our purpose of intra-country analysis this does not 
represent a great problem, since the denominator is common for all our regions. 
     
Both groups of regions are not representing either geographical concentration or 
economic characteristics, meaning that there is no other common denominator between 
regions with high level of autonomy or between regions with low level of autonomy 
other than their political status. The next figure has the purpose that there is no 
systematic difference in the way both groups of regions receive the Structural Funds 
from the EU. The level of transfers is slightly larger for regions with high level of 
autonomy since they run more competencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For example, a great increase of Central Government Expenditure in 1987 due to financial operations 
after the entrance of Spain in the EU has induced an “abnormal” decrease of the value of the ratio for all 
regions in this year. 
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 Figure 5: Capital transfers from the EU to the Spanish regional governments.  
 (% GDP and Euro per capita) 
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              Source: “Liquidación del presupuesto de las CCAA” 
 
 
The increase in the size regional governments has also affected the distribution of public 
regional spending among the different economic categories. The regions have 
augmented the share of current spending, devoting a minor part of their funds to 
increasing their stock of capital (Figure 6). 
  
One might think that this situation could be induced by a certain reallocation of 
competencies between the central and regional governments. However, the Central 
Government has not increased its share of capital expenditure, but has, on the contrary, 
slightly decreased it. The fall in capital share of public expenditure is clearly more 
relevant in the regions with low levels of competencies, which are also those that have 
undergone a more profound process of decentralization.  
 
 
         Figure 6: Ratio Capital to Total Expenditure 
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A deeper analysis of the functional categories10 reveals that the category "Social Public 
Goods" -using the nomenclature of the functional classification used by the Spanish 
"Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda"- is the main area of decentralization for the 
regions with a low level of competencies as well as the main component of the public 
budget. Other functional categories that have experienced a significant level of 
decentralization have been "Social Security and Promotion", "Economic regulation of 
Productive Sectors", "General Public Services" and "Economic Public Goods" 
    
 
 
3. Sources of Data 
 
The model is estimated for a balanced panel of the seventeen Spanish regions over the 
period 1993-2007. The sample begins in 1993 because of the lack of data from previous 
years in our series of capital transfers to the regional governments.  Nevertheless, the 
first allocation of the Structural Actions under their current format takes place in 1989. 
We use data until 2007 due to data availability. 
       
The main datasource for our variables of interest, disaggregated public expenditure for 
the Spanish regions, is the database "Liquidación de Presupuestos de las Comunidades 
Autonomas" published by the Ministry of Economy of Spain. Some of these data are 
also available online in the BADESPE database, elaborated by the "Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales". 
 
     
3.2. Dependent variable 
     
The dependent variable is public investment, expressed as a share of GDP, of the 
Spanish regional governments.  
 
The data for Public Investment –defined as public capital expenditure, which includes 
real investment as well as capital transfers- have been extracted from the database 
“Liquidación de los Presupuestos de las Comunidades Autónomas” published by the 
Ministry of Economics. The series for GDP have been extracted from the National 
Statitical Institute (INE). 
 
     
3.3. Explanatory variables 
 
The independent variable in which we focus most of our attention is the capital transfers 
from the European Union to the Spanish regional governments, and we call it EUSF. It 
includes the accrual revenues of the regional governments corresponding to transfers 
from the European Union budget to the capital account, under the concept of any of the 
Structural Funds or the Cohesion Fund. Most of these tranfers will correspond to the 
three Structural Funds devoted to promote Investment  (ERDF, EAGGF and FIFG) or to 
the Cohesion Fund.  
 
 In some of our estimations we include also a measure of Fiscal Decentralization, that 
we denote “DEC”. We recall here the controversy described in Martinez-Vazquez and 
                                                          
10 See González-Alegre (2008) 
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McNab (2005) about the construction of a variable representing fiscal autonomy. In 
principle, such a variable should be able to quantify the activities of sub-national 
governments resulting from their independent decisions. Very often, there are some 
expenditures are carried out by some levels of the public administration while the 
effective control of these policy remain on a higher level of the public administration.  
 
In practice, the available data do not let us to address properly these issues. The 
literature has adopted the standard measure11 of fiscal decentralization described by 
Oates (1972) based on local or sub-national to total public expenditure ratio. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the level of fiscal autonomy is correlated to the share of 
public resources managed by a regional government. 
     
Alternatively, the level of fiscal autonomy could be instrumented according to the 
revenues side of the budget, as the ratio between the public revenues collected at the 
regional level to the national level (Ebel and Yilmaz (2002)). We have discarded the use 
of a decentralization measure based on the revenue side of the budget as made by other 
authors12. The main reason is that in our set of regions the expenditure side of the 
budget accommodates better the implementation of new competencies in regional 
governments, while the sources of revenues, especially tax revenues, is more dependent 
on the subsequent reforms made to the financing system of the regions13. 
     
The level of decentralization is built as the ratio of per capita regional expenditure to per 
capita central government expenditure. The ratio has been constructed using data on 
regional public expenditure extracted from the database "Presupuestos de las 
Comunidades Autonomas"; the data on public expenditure by the central government 
has been extracted from BADESPE; the series of population are from EUROSTAT. 
         
                                        [Table 1 here] 
   
     
The selection of the remaining control variables has been largely based on studies 
focused on the determinants of public capital spending, keeping in mind that most of 
these studies use country data and some of the variables that they include would not fit 
in our regional panel data (budget deficit or industrialized country dummy, for 
example).  
 
The set of control variables includes Public Consumption14, Private Investment 
population growth, GDP growth, and regionalized central government capital 
expenditure. Private Investment is a key determinant of Public Investment according to 
De Haan et al. (1996) and Sturm (2001). The motivation to include an indicator of the 
expenditure capacity of the government –Public Consumption- can be found, among 
others, in Kneller et al. (1999 who) suggest that we should also include a variable to 
account for the public spending not devoted to investment. Increases in the level of 
public consumption and in general, in the spending possibilities of the country should 
naturally have an effect on Public Investment. We consider Public Consumption as an 
                                                          
11 Zang and Zou (1998), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005), Iimi (2004) and Jin, Qian and Weingast 
(2005), make use of this definition in order to account for fiscal decentralization. 
12 De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996), Diaz-Cayeroet al. (2002). 
13 See González-Alegre (2008) 
14 Defined as public current expenditures. 
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indicator of the variations of the spending capacity in the budgets of the public bodies of 
the country. 
 
Changes in population could be a determinant of the necessities of public capital 
relative to publicly provided consumption goods. It might also explain the possible scale 
effects existing in particular kinds of investment via the marginal cost of additional 
users, in the case of "pure" public goods. Population has been included as an 
approximation of labour force supply in many studies that examine the productivity of 
public capital (Ramirez (1998) and Everaert and Heylen (2001)). 
 
 The rate of production growth is traditionally included as a determinant of public 
expenditure.15 It has been argued that the income elasticity of the demand of some 
public goods could affect the allocation of public expenditure as growth rates fluctuate. 
(This is a version of Wagner's Law) It could also take cyclical factors into account, 
especially when there is no other variable attached to the business cycle in the model. 
     
Central government capital expenditure tries to control for the policy of the central 
government regarding public capital, and the substitution effect that could induce to 
regions. We have retrieved these series, with regional level of breakdown, from two 
datasources: IVIE database (until 2000) and the General Budget (“Presupuestos 
Generales del Estado”) from 2001 onwards. We were able to check the consistency 
among both series, since we had data from the General Budget prior to 2000. 
     
Restrictive fiscal policy measures may also be induced by high levels of budget deficits 
or government debt. Roubini and Sachs (1989) show that capital expenditures suffer 
more drastically under the implementation of these restrictive fiscal policies. This is a 
consequence of the fact that very often this kind of expenditure is less rigid than other 
public expenditure categories (De Haan et al (1996)). More recent results by Mehrotra 
and Valila (2006) using cointegration techniques support this hypothesis. In our case, 
since we work with regional-level data and the leeway of Spanish deficit to incur into 
deficit in the period under consideration was extremely limited, we have decided to omit 
a variable capturing public deficit at the regional level. We will include this variable 
only in the equivalent estimation using country-level data, whose results are shown in 
table 11.  
 
There have been several studies trying to link political variables to the tendency to alter 
patterns of public spending. The political variables that could affect government 
spending might be the kind of party in power, the kind of government (coalition, 
majority government or minority government) and the political influences of lobbying. 
The more conclusive results have been found in studies that link the influence of 
political variables on the level of public spending (Roubini and Sachs (1989)) or debt-
related issues.16 However, studies focused on public investment have not been able to 
find any significant link of the current level of public investment with political 
variables. We recall here the results in Sturm (2001), for non OECD countries, De 
                                                          
15See for example Miller and Russek (1997), Knelleret al. (1999) Bose et al. (2003). 
 
 
16De Haan and Sturm (1997), see Sturm (2001) for a detailed literature review 
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Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996), for OECD countries, and Mizutani and Tanaka (2005), 
who use regional data from Japan prefectures. Therefore, we do not include any 
political variable among our set of controls. 
  
                                        [Table 2 here] 
     
 
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
 
In this section we construct and estimate a panel data model evaluating the efficiency of 
the European Regional policy by estimating the response of public investment towards 
the grants that tend to promote it.  
 
In order to asses the importance of fiscal decentralization in these mechanisms, we try 
different methodological strategies. First of all, we will split the sample in two sub-
sample groups with different levels of fiscal autonomy. We will use two alternative 
criteria for splitting the sample: one according to the level of fiscal autonomy 
recognized in the Spanish Constitution and the second one depending on the time-
dimension of the panel, taking advantage of the evolution of fiscal decentralization 
across time.  
 
Secondly, we will introduce the variable “fiscal decentralization” in our panel, and an 
interaction term relating this variable with the structural actions´ transfers that will 
capture the joint effect of both variables 
 
Finally, we consider the possibility of estimating a system of equations that determines, 
simultaneously, the two variables in which we focus our interest: Public Investment and 
EUSF. 
 
 
4.1 Breaking the Sample 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that public investment may be affected by European 
Structural Funds ' grants, we have constructed a model in which the dependent variable 
is Public Investment at the regional level for the seventeen Spanish regional bodies. The 
set of explanatory variables includes our main variable of interest, EUSF, represent the 
capital transfers from the EU to the regional government allocated to the region "i " in 
the current year "t ". We have also introduced in the model other control variables: 
private investment, public consumption, GDP growth, population growth, and central 
government investment, included in the vector x: 
 
 
i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i tδ β α ε+                (1) 
 
Where δ  is the coefficient that describes the impact of Structural Funds on Public 
Investment and the main target of our estimation; x  is a vector, (1x5), of explanatory 
variables and  β  is the set of parameters, (5x1) associated to these control variables that 
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must be estimated; iα  is the unobservable unit-specific effect and ,i tε is the 
unobservable error term. 
 
In order to estimate equation (1), we have split the sample attending to the level of fiscal 
autonomy of the regions. We have taken two alternative criteria into consideration in 
order to consider sub-samples: firstly, we have classified Spanish regions into two 
subgroups according to the level of fiscal autonomy that the Spanish Constitution 
recognizes them. Therefore, we create a group of what the Spanish Constitution 
considers17 “Historic Nationalities”, and a second group of the remaining ten regions18, 
for which the Constitutions recognized a lower level of Autonomy. 
  
Secondly, we have considered the time-dimension of the series in order to consider two 
alternative subgroups with remarkable differences in their level of fiscal autonomy. If 
we examine Figure NUMBER, we may notice that the evolution of fiscal autonomy 
across time will let us split the sample and create two groups in which the level of fiscal 
decentralization achieved is reasonably stable across years in each group but different 
between them. We have selected the year 2000 as the break point, which in addition will 
leave us two subsamples of similar length.  
 
The use of two alternative criteria to divide the sample will let us overcome some of the 
shortcomings which are attached to each criteria. On the one hand, splitting the sample 
according to the role recognized in the Constitution may arise the doubt that we may be 
accounting for a systematic difference between both groups of regions that may not 
come from the level of fiscal autonomy but from an ignored source19. On the other 
hand, breaking the sample into two time-periods may be interpreted as a the 
identification of some structural change across time. 
     
Primary estimations of equation (1) suggest the presence of autocorrelated errors. 
Therefore, the original model in equation has been estimated in the presence of serially 
correlated errors20.  
 
Initially, we also assume strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables: 
     
 
, ,[ , ] 0i s i tE x ε =     t,s=1,2,...T. 
 
     
This assumption may be considered too strong for our model. Many results21 show that 
the allocation of public expenditure may be endogenous to the allocation of grants. The 
distribution of the Structural Funds may be thought to respond to some unobserved 
necessities and conjuncture that simultaneously drives decisions on public investment. 
We must admit the possibility that some of the explanatory variables, in particular eusf, 
                                                          
17 Andalusia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre and Valencian Community.  
18 Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile and Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura 
Comunidad de Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja.  
19 Although, there are no remarkable differences in the level of economic development between both 
groups of regions. There are no, either, geographical, commercial or cultural differences among them.  
20 Preliminary estimations suggest also the use of fixed-effects models. The results of the random effects 
estimations, as well as the Hausman test are omitted for the sake of brevity. 
21 Knight (2002), Becker (1996), Besley and Case (2000) 
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must be correlated to the error term since the propensity to increase public investment 
may incentive larger allocation of Structural Funds (thus, making causality run in the 
opposite direction to the one assumed in the paper).  
     
The immediate solution to the problem would be to find some instrumental variables 
correlated to structural funds but orthogonal to public investment. Alternatively, we can 
use lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as instruments. The GMM 
estimation method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) relies on the orthogonality 
of the dependent and explanatory variables with the first differences of the error 
component in lagged periods. This method allows us to include endogenous and 
predetermined dependent variables.  
 
These GMM methods construct moment conditions that reflect this orthogonality, under 
assumption of serially uncorrelated shocks, error components and predetermined initial 
conditions22. The problem would be, therefore, that we have previously admitted the 
possibility of the existence or AR(1) errors in the original model, which implies that 
lagged values of the dependent and explanatory variables are correlated with past 
shocks and the moment conditions that should be used23, are no longer valid in the 
original model 
 
     
For that reason, we transform the static model into a dynamic one with serially 
uncorrelated shocks by substracting the autocorrelation term attached to the original 
errors: 
     
             i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i tδ β α ε+    where  , , ,1i t i t i te e uρ= − +  
 
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t ,PubInv  = *PubInv +  eusf  -  eusf +  x  -  x  +(1- ) i i tuρ δ ρδ β ρβ ρ α +        (2) 
     
Equation (2) represents a model with serially uncorrelated shocks that we can estimate 
using Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for dynamic panels. The explanatory 
variables are correlated with the individual effects and are assumed to be endogenous 
with respect to the serially uncorrelated shocks.  
 
 
4.1.1. Estimation Results 
 
Table 5 shows the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) when we divide our 
sample according to the level of autonomy recognized for the regions in the Spanish 
Constitution. Columns [1] to [4] include the estimation for the regions with a lower 
level of autonomy -as described in the article 151 of the Constitution- while columns [5] 
to [8] include the estimations for the remaining seven regions, with a larger level of 
fiscal autonomy, as described in the article 143 of the Spanish Constitution.  
 
                                                          
22 , ,[ ] [ ] [ ] 0i i t i i tE E Eα ε α ε= = =  ; , ,[ ] 0i s i tE ε ε = for t s≠  and , 1 ,[ ] 0i i tE PubInv ε =  
t=2,...T.respectively. 
23 , ,[ ] 0i t s i tE PubInv ε− Δ =  for t=3,…T and 2s ≥ ; , ,[ ] 0i t s i tE x ε− Δ = , for t=3,…T and 2s ≥ if 
variables in x are endogenous 
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Columns [1]-[2] and [5]-[8] assume a fixed-effects24 model with autocorrelated errors, 
while [3]-[4] and [7]-[8] are estimates for equation (2) obtaining assuming engogeneity 
of explanatory variables using one-step version of the GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). In addition, we assume two sets of control variables, one 
more general and one more restrained.  
 
Results are quite homogeneous among models for every set of regions. The Structural 
Actions (EUSF) seem to be a significant determinant of Public Investment in the 
regions with low level of competencies, being the coefficient estimated significantly 
larger that 0 and smaller than one. However, for the regions with a high level of 
competencies, the coefficients estimated are smaller and generally insignificantly 
positive.  
 
As for the remaining control variables, the main source of variability between both data-
sets in the coefficient attached to Public Consumption that show a behaviour quite 
similar to the one described for EUSF. Public consumption will capture the effects of 
the size of the regional administration. It is expected to increase with larger fiscal 
autonomy and, therefore, induce further increases also in Public Investment. Private 
investment is a positive determinant of Public Investment in all cases while the 
remaining control variables do not seem to play a key role.  
 
Having estimated a different effect of the Structural Actions on Public Investment for 
the two groups of regions, we also make a second estimation by splitting the sample 
through the time dimension. If we examine Figure 4, we can see how the level of fiscal 
autonomy of both groups of regions has increased over time. If we break the sample 
around year 2000, we observe that the level of fiscal autonomy has remained relatively 
stable for both groups of regions across time, keeping a significant difference among 
them.  
 
The results of the equivalent estimations are shown in Table 6. We have estimated an 
impact of the EUSF on Public Investment larger and significantly positive for the period 
1993-1999, while the estimates for the period 2000-2007 show poor levels of 
significance. Regarding Public Consumptions, the differences observed in the previous 
estimation remain but are less strong The behaviour of the other control variables 
remains stable.  
 
Finally, we run an equivalent estimation using country-level data from the fiveteen 
oldest Member States of the EU25. The data are described in table 4 while the results are 
shown in table 7. We have used the same model except for minor modifications with 
respect to the control variables: the inclusion of central government public investment 
has been discarded for obvious reasons, while we add to the level of deficit or surplus as 
a percentage of GDP, as motivated earlier. For the interpretation of the different models 
with alternative fiscal variables, we recall controversy described in Kneller et al. (1999) 
about the omitted variable issue.  
 
                                                          
24 The selection of the fixed-effects model has been made upon estimation of the equivalent random-
effects model and the corresponding Hausman (1979) test. Acordingly, the autocorrelated errors have 
been included upon estimation of preliminary models.  
25 We use data retrieved from Eurostat for the period 1999-2007, expressed in the same units as in the 
previous estimations. 
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This additional estimation with country-level data do not yield interesting conclusions 
over the previous results, since the variable object of our interest, the EUSF, is found to 
be significantly zero in all possible models. Or course, this could be due to the fact that 
the effectiveness of the EUSF in Spain is larger than the European average, but there are 
many other possible explanations for this result and we do not intent to deep into the 
controversy here, since is not the purpose of this paper.  
 
To sum up, by splitting the sample according to the level of fiscal autonomy of the 
regions we observe that the impact of the Structural Actions on Public Investment is 
larger in the group with a smaller level of fiscal autonomy. We have shown this by 
using two alternative criteria in order to split the sample: the level of fiscal autonomy 
recognized in the Spanish Constitution and the time-evolution of fiscal decentralization 
in the country as a whole.  
 
 
4.2. Interaction Term 
 
In order to take into account for the effect of the evolution Fiscal Decentralization on 
the relationship between the Structural Actions and Public investment, we will make use 
of an Interaction term. Interaction terms may be added to a model in order to 
incorporate the joint effect of two variables on a dependent variable, over and above 
their separate effects. These are usually added as the cross-product of two independent 
variables, typically placing them after the simple "main effects".  
  
In this subchapter, we will analyze the interaction of fiscal decentralization (represented 
by the variable “dec”) and the capital transfers received by regional governments 
(represented by “eusf”). The separate effect of both variables are expected to be 
positive, since an increase in the level of fiscal decentralization (measured as the ratio of 
per capita regional over national public expenditures) is assumed to increase the size of 
regional governments and, therefore, increase on public expenditures –compressive of 
public investment-. The effect of the capital transfers through the Structural Actions 
(eusf) would follow the arguments examined in the previous subchapter.  
 
i,t (1) i,t (2) (3) i,t ,PubInv  =  eusf  + dec+ eusf*dec+  x   + i i tδ δ δ β α ε+            (3) 
 
The interaction term would capture, therefore, the joint effect of these two variables. We 
can see in table 8 the results of estimating the model represented by equation (3) for the 
whole sample. We have expanded our set of alternative control variables, since we 
expected that the correlation between “Public Consumption” and DEC might be 
problematic. The results, however, look quite robust with respect to this issue. As for 
the estimation assumptions and methodology, we have follow similar guidelines as 
tables 5-7. 
 
We have estimated a negative coefficient attached to the interaction term in all cases. 
The level of significance, however, is variable and seems to depend on the set of 
controls. The negative coefficient means that the join effect of additional 
decentralization and public investment becomes weaker. If we assume a fixed level of 
decentralization, for example, additional EUSF will induce an effect on Public 
investment equal to the coefficient estimated for EUSF plus the coefficient estimated for 
the interaction term times decentralization. Given that the coefficient estimated for the 
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interaction term is negative, the effect of EUSF on public investment is positive, but 
decreasing for larger decentralization. 
 
Crossproduct interaction terms may be highly correlated with the corresponding simple 
independent variables in the regression equation, creating problems with assessing the 
relative importance of main effects and interaction effects. Because of this, sometimes it 
may well be desirable to use centered variables (where one has subtracted the mean 
from each datum). This transformation often reduces multicollinearity. For the sake of 
robustness, we have also run equivalent estimation using a centered interaction term and 
the results do not change significantly (see table 9) 
 
 
4.3. Simultaneous Equation model  
 
We want to check the robustness of our result to the introduction of a simultaneous 
equation model (SEM), in which we capture causality in both directions. One could 
think that the two variables in which we focus our interest: eusf and public investment, 
are jointly determined by a system of equations. In fact, the political decision of 
investing is closely related to the political decision of allocating –or making use of- the 
Structural Funds. Also the economic realization of the payments is closely related given 
that both variables are often related to common investment projects.  
 
In addition, each one of the variables may be a determinant of the other one. So far we 
have considered that the allocation of Structural Funds may encourage Public 
Investment, but me must be aware that the propensity to invest in the public sector may 
also incentive the allocation of Structural Funds in a particular region.  
 
The system would consist on two structural equations, on in which the dependent 
variable is Public Investment, while in the other the capital transfers allocated through 
the Structural Funds. This SEM would be autonomous, since each equation has 
economic meaning in isolation of the other. Each of the equations includes one of the 
variables as dependent variable but also the other one as an explanatory –endogenous- 
variable. In addition to these, we also include a set of exogenous variables26:  
 
 
i,t (1) i,t (1) (1)i,t (1) (1) ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x   + i i tδ β α ε+          (4) 
i,t (2) i,t (2) (2)i,t (2) (2) ,eusf  = PubInv   +  x   + i i tδ β α ε+          (5) 
 
Where (1) x and (2) x  are two vectors, (1xm) and (1xn) respectively, of exogenous 
explanatory variables. Both vectors are not identical, but they can share some variables. 
                                                          
26 One might be tempted to think that Public Current Expenditures should take part of the simultaneous 
equations model as an endogenous variable. As Wooldridge (2002) describes for an example relating 
hours devoted to crime with hours devoted to work, the choice of the share of the public budget devoted 
to current expenditures and to investment is the solution of the maximization problem of the utility 
function of the government and depends on exogenous factors –like the population, level of education, 
private investment, etc-. Of course, some endogeneity may arise when estimating the relations among 
both variables, but we consider that this possibility is more related to an omitted variables problem –or 
even to measurement error- rather than to simultaneity. The case for Public Investment and Capital 
Transfers (EUSF) is different since in this case both expenses are accrued simultaneously when referred 
to the same investment project. 
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(1) β  and (2) β  are the set of parameters, (mx1) and (nx1) respectively, associated to the 
exogenous variables that must be estimated. (1)iα  and (2)iα are the unobservable unit-
specific effects and (1) ,i tε and (2) ,i tε  are the unobservable error terms. 
 
We estimate the model above following different alternative estimation methods in 
order to check for the robustness of the results27. First of all, we assume that the source 
of endogeneity is present through a positive correlation between the endogenous 
variables and the error term (1) ,i tε . In this setup, the model may be estimates assuming 
Fixed-Effects through two-stage least-squares (FE-2SLS) and assuming Random-
Effects through the Error-Component two-stage least-squares estimator developed by 
Baltagi(1981)28. Results obtained using this estimation strategy are presented in table 
10. 
 
 
Alternatively, we may assume that the source of endogeneity comes from the positive 
correlation between the idiosyncratic term and the endogenous variables. The 
explanatory variables are, then, orthogonal to the structural errors and the exogenous 
variables are, in addition, orthogonal to the idiosyncratic term, α . If we assume  Fixed-
Effects, the model can be estimated by OLS after the within transformation, as shown 
by Cornwell et al. (1992).  
 
For the cases in which the unit-specific effects are random, we make use of the Two-
stage least-square Hausman and Taylor (1981) procedure (HT-2SLS) estimator29. The 
method of 2SLS is the most common method used for estimating simultaneous-
equations models, because of their simplicity and asymptotic efficiency. In this case, we 
include also additional variables on equations NUMBER AND NUIMBER, (1) z and (2) z  
respectively, which are two vectors of time-invariant explanatories30, including both 
endogenous and exogenous variables: 
 
                   i,t (1) i,t (1) (1)i,t (1) (1)i (1) (1) ,PubInv  =  eusf  +  x  + z  + i i tδ β ϕ α ε+                             (6) 
                      i,t (2) i,t (2) (2)i,t (2) (2)i (2) (2) ,eusf  = PubInv   +  x  + z  + i i tδ β ϕ α ε+        (7) 
 
Usually, as we are not interested in their effect, time-invariant variables are omitted 
since their effect may be captured by the idiosyncratic-term. However, for the HT 2SLS 
estimator, they are used as instruments to estimate the system, so it may be useful to 
include them. We describe in table 3 the time invariant variables included in the HT 
2SLS regression. These are, basically, determinants of the Investment needs and 
economic performance at the beginning of the sample and its selection has been made 
                                                          
27 We use limited information estimators, which means that every equation of the system is estimated at a 
time, in contrast to full-information systems, in which the estimators are based on the entire systems of 
equations. 
28 See Baltagi (2005) for details on this estimator.  
29 There are alternative procedures to the HT, for example the Amemiya and Mc Curdi (1986) or the 
Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989), which make use of additional instruments but at the cost of 
additional assumptions about the exogeneity of the explanatory variables and all their future and past 
values. See Cornwell et al. (1992) for a detailed description of the different estimators and their 
properties.  
30 The time-independent variables included for the estimation through the Hausman-Taylor procedure are 
described in table [] 
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upon consultation of several studies addressing public investment31. Results upon the 
assumption that the endogenous variables are correlated with the unit-specific term are 
shown in table 11. 
 
Both, tables 10 and 11, show similar results with respect to most of the variables under 
consideration. The results previously observed with respect to the impact of the 
Structural Funds on Public investment are reinforced in after this estimation, although it 
must be stressed that the option in which we assume fixed-effect and orthogonality of 
the endogenous variables with the error term (table 11) yields poor significant 
coefficients. Public Investment, simultaneously, seems to be a key determinant of the 
volume of Structural Funds allocated to each region in each period, although the 
coefficients attached to this direction of the causality are significantly smaller than those 
from equation (4) and (6).  
 
Decentralization is a positive determinant of public investment. This result was know 
from the previous estimations of the paper and it was also expected, since the variable 
fiscal decentralization is an indicator of the size of the regional government32 and, 
therefore, of its expenditure power.  
 
Nevertheless, we find a significant negative coefficient when estimating the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on the Structural funds (equations (5) and (7)). This result may be 
linked to the main hypothesis of this paper that relates the efficiency level of the 
Structural Funds to the degree of fiscal autonomy of subsidized governments. At a first 
glance, one might be tempted to think that after increasing the level of fiscal autonomy 
of a region, Public investment may be spread over more heterogeneous policy areas. 
This expansion may be attached to competencies that are not eligible for the Structural 
Funds, reducing, therefore, the possibility of the government to maintain the 
relationship between Structural Funds and public investment.  
 
Of course there are many alternative interpretations that could justify the coefficient 
estimated. In any case, most of them would be related to the fact that the Structural 
Funds become less efficient when related to administrations with larger levels of 
autonomy.  
 
The coefficient estimated for the exogenous variables are, in general, expected and 
consistent across models. Among them, the level of significance of “population growth” 
as a negative determinant of public investment becomes relevant with respect to 
previous subchapters of this paper. It is not surprising, in any case, that public 
investment should depend negatively on the level of population growth since an 
increasing population will naturally demand for larger current expenditures and will 
constraint further the budget possibilities of the government to invest.  
 
Tables 12 and 13 replicate the SEM estimation after splitting the sample into the group 
of regions with low level of competencies (art. 151) and the regions with high level of 
competencies (art. 143). Table 13 presents the results assuming that the source of the 
endogeneity is the correlation of the variables with the unit-specific effect, while table 
                                                          
31 With a particular attention to Mitze (2007), since he uses also this simultaneous equation estimator 
32 As well as the variable “Public Consumption. In fact, one might expect a significant level of colinearity 
between both variables, which would justify the use of the alternative models estimated, as introduced 
before.  
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13 assumes correlation with the error term. We have estimated only the reduced 
versions of the models assuming both, random and fixed-effects.  
 
The estimations have to be taken cautiously since the number of observations, in 
particular in the case of the regions with high level of autonomy, is a bit limited. In 
general, the coefficients estimated for the regions with low level of autonomy a larger in 
absolute value and level of significance for the variables of our interest. The results for 
the equations explaining Public Investment confirm our previous chapters.  
 
Public investment, as a determinant of EUSF is stronger also in the regions with low 
level of autonomy, while in the regions with high level of autonomy, EUSF seem to 
depend very few of the propensity of the government to invest. This result could 
motivate the previous one: if the matching-mechanism of the grants do not work so well 
in decentralized regions, one should naturally expect also the grants to be less effective 
there.  
 
Finally, also the level of fiscal decentralization as a determinant of EUSF seems to be 
more –negatively- important in regions with low level of autonomy. That is somehow 
an expected result since these regions have experienced the larger decentralization 
process and, in any case, confirm our previous suspicious that by gaining fiscal 
autonomy regions find it more difficult to be eligible for additional grants.    
 
 
4.4. Previous literature 
 
In this section we present a brief review of empirical studies related to the issue address 
here. To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies trying to link the Structural 
Actions with the response of public expenditure in governments that perceive it. In 
addition, the issue of fiscal decentralization has been usually addressed linked to 
economic growth. Therefore, none of the studies presented ahead will be comparable to 
the research we undertake in this paper, but they have a common denominator with one 
of the main issues introduced here: fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental grants or 
the Regional Policy of the EU.  
 
 
Decentralization  
     
The first empirical studies about decentralization have traditionally focused their 
attention towards the relationship of decentralization with enonomic growth. The 
literature has not been able to find a clear relationship between additional fiscal 
decentralization and higher economic growth. While some studies suggest that 
decentralization may foster growth33 (Iimi (2004), using panel data from 1997 to 2001 
for 51 countries), other studies find no clear relationship (Xie, Davoodi and Zou (1999) 
for the US; Woller and Phillips (1998) for a panel of developing countries) and some 
other studies show that fiscal decentralization may be detrimental for growth (Zhang 
and Zou (1998) for China; Davoodi and Zou (1998) for developing countries; and 
Thornton (2006) for developed countries). With respect to the Spanish case, Carrion-i-
Silvestre et al. (2008) find that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on economic 
                                                          
33 Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Laborda (2005) also find a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth for Spain, when decentralization is referred to tax autonomy.  
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growth for the regions with the highest levels of fiscal and institutional decentralization, 
but the opposite effect is found for those regions with lower levels of competencies. 
Esteban (2006), however, find a positive correlation for the regions with low level of 
competencies. In contrast, Perez and Cantarero (2006) find insignificant correlation 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for the Spanish regions. 
 
Of course, the dimension of the results will depend on the origin of the data, since the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy shall necessarily depend on the quality 
of many other economic or institutional variables. Thiessen (2003), using a panel of 
developed OEDC countries, unmasks one of the more intuitive factors that could play a 
role in fiscal decentralization. He concludes that there is an optimal level of 
decentralization over which no additional gains are obtained from decentralizing. In 
fact, on might think that, in addition to any other institutional and economic factors, the 
actual level of fiscal decentralization may be a key determinant of the success of 
decentralization policies.  
     
Some other empirical studies have tried to find the channel through which fiscal 
decentralization could affect economic growth. The impact that decentralization could 
have on the level of inflation has been found to be insignificant (Treisman (2000), 
Rodden and Wibbels (2002)). Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006) examine the 
impact that decentralization could have on macroeconomic stability finding a positive 
relation that would imply an indirect positive impact with economic growth. Other links 
have been established betweeen decentralization and the level of corruption (Fisman 
and Gatti (2002) and the level of political participation (Huther and Shah (1998)). 
     
The branch of this literature that show a closer link to this study is probably the area that 
look at the link of fiscal decentralization with the composition of public expenditures34. 
This issue has only begun to be addressed recently. Arze , Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2005) find strong evidence of the hypothesis, especially for developing 
countries, that higher levels of fiscal decentralization increase the shares of consumption 
expenditures in the public budget (in particular, they refer to education and health 
expenditures as publicly provided private goods). González-Alegre (2009) shows a 
similar result for the Spanish regions regarding the share between current and capital 
expenditures. Faguet (2004) analyses the effects of the process of decentralization in 
Bolivia at the local level, and finds that the functional composition of public 
expenditure changes with decentralization to a more efficient allocation. He looks at 
several functional categories of expenditure and shows that the distribution of public 
expenditure is more adapted to local needs after the decentralization process that 
experienced this country in 1994. 
 
 
The European Cohesion Policy as Intergovernmental Grants 
 
The Structural Actions that we study here is part of the so-called, European Cohesion 
policy or European Regional Policy, whose target is to foster economic growth in these 
less-developed areas of the Union. Many opinions are relatively pessimistic with respect 
to the results of this policy. In fact, the map of the geographical areas that are the target 
                                                          
34 Molero (2002) incluye a detailed analisys of the evolution of public expenditure in Spanish regions for 
the period in which fiscal decentralization takes place. Alvárez et al. (2000) relates the relationship of 
fiscal decentralization in Spain to the size of the public sector.  
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of structural actions in the several programs run by the EU, has showed little change 
through the several programs.35 There are many empirical studies that support this 
opinion: Dall 'Erba and Le Gallo (2003) use a model that controls for spatial spillover 
effects among regions, since they detect the presence of a growth diffusion process, 
especially on the core regions of the EU. They suggest that the small extent of spillover 
effects in peripheral regions could be an explanation of their backwardness, and that 
even greater targeted funds do not allow spillovers in periphery. Rogríguez-Pose and 
Fratesi (2004) use panel data analysis to identify the lack of upward mobility of assisted 
regions and the absence of regional convergence. They think that the failure of the EU 
Structural policy may come from the excessive skewness towards infrastructure and 
business support of development strategies in Objective 1 regions.  
 
There are also some more optimistic results, especially in studies focused on particular 
member countries. Percoco (2005) analyses the effect of the Structural Funds on the 
economic growth of the Italian Objective 1 regions and finds that induced growth rates 
depend highly on the institutional behaviour of the subsidized government. At the 
European level, the analysis by Ederveen et al. (2002) comprises most of the issues 
arised by the EU to evaluate the performance of the policies and yield a positive 
evaluation of the past performance of the Structural Funds although arising also some 
questions about their future. Ederveen and Gorter (2002) are, however, more pessimistic 
when it comes to the effects in terms of convergence.  
 
There are a great number of studies focused on the particular case of Spain. De la 
Fuente (2002) suggest that the impact of the Structural Funds in Spain has added around 
a percentage point to annual output growth in the average Objective 1 region and 0.4 
points to employment growth. The results in Sosvilla-Rivero (2005) are more optimistic 
in term of employment growth. Lima and Cardenete (2007) share this view and arise the 
importance of the long-term effects of the policies. Pardo Garcia (2003) is equally 
optimistic about their impact and suggest that in the future the policies should take care 
of enhancing human capital. Farrell (2004) shows the importance of institutional quality 
on the effectiveness of the Structural Actions, in a compared analysis with Ireland.  
 
In this paper, however, we look at the impact of the Structural Actions on the behaviour 
of public investment since we think that one of the main scopes of these actions –with 
the exception of the European Social Fund- is to promote investment in the public 
sector. None of the aforementioned studies address this issue. We have made a first 
attempt to look at the problem in Gonzalez Alegre (2008), and show the impact that, at 
a European level, the funds may have in enhancing public investment. In contrast, there 
are many studies that address the same problem for a different economic environment, 
in particular with US data. The closer to this one is probably the work36 by Knight 
(2002) who studied the response of state expenditure on public highways to grants 
provided by the Federal aid highway program. The target of this Federal grants program 
is to enlarge public expenditure in a determinate area but he finds that federal grants do 
significantly crowd out state expenditure on highways, so expenditure finally would 
increase around 18% of the grant received.  
                                                          
351994-1999 and 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. 
 
 
36 A complete review of the empirical literature analyzing intergovernmental grants may be found in 
Gonzalez Alegre (1998) 
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Autor/s 
(year) 
Main Issue Data 
coverage 
Methodology Main Results 
Alvárez , 
Arizaga and 
Aparicio 
(2000) 
The impact of 
fiscal 
decentralization 
on the size of the 
public sector 
Spanish 
public sector 
at the 
regional 
level, 1993 
Estimation of a 
model for cross-
sectional data 
Fiscal decentralization has a 
negative impact on the size of the 
public sector 
Molero 
(2002) 
Public Spending 
and Fiscal 
Federalism in 
Spain 
Spanish 
Public 
Administrati
ons, 1988 
1998 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Fiscal decentralization is more 
related to Public Expenditure 
related to economic intervention in 
regions with low level of 
competencies, while in regions with 
a high level of competencies is 
more related to Redistribution. 
De la Fuente 
(2002) 
Impact of EU 
Cohesion Policy 
on Spanish 
Objective 1 
Regions 
Spanish 
Region-level 
data, 1994-
2006 
Panel-data 
estimation of 
growth model, and 
calibration of the 
impact. 
The EU Funds add one percentage 
point to annual output growth in 
and 0.4 percentage points to 
employment growth. 
Pardo Garcia 
(2003) 
European 
Cohesion Policy 
in Spanish 
Regions 
Spanish 
Regions, 
1988-1999 
Descriptive 
analysis of the 
Community 
Support 
Framework 
The weakest regions have improved 
their infrastructures, but there are 
many differences about their 
innovation capacity, knowledge 
access, information, and the training 
of human resources. 
 
Farrell (2004) 
Effect of 
European 
Cohesion Policy 
on Spanish and 
Irish Economies. 
National-
level data, 
1990-2000 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
EUSF promoted economic growth, 
but more efficiently in Ireland. In 
Spain, regional disparities actually 
increased. Part of the explanation 
lies with the institutional 
differences and policy decisions 
taken in each Public 
Administration. 
Sosvilla 
Rivero (2005) 
Impact of EUSF 
on growth and 
employment 
Spanish 
Objective 1 
Regions 
(1989 2006) 
Adaptation of the 
HERMIN model to 
the Spanish regions 
(demand and 
supply effects of 
the EUSF). 
Average increase of 0.56 percentage 
points in the growth rates . Average 
increase in per capita income of 
425 euros at 1999 prices. Increase 
of 1.46 per cent in employment. 
 
Perez 
González and 
Cantarero 
Prieto (2006) 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
and Economic 
Growth 
Spanish 
Regional 
Data, (1986-
2001) 
Panel data model. 
Fixed-Effects and 
Instrumental 
Variables. 
 
The impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic 
growth is insignificant. 
Gil-Serrate 
and López-
Laborda 
(2005) 
Tax-
decentralization 
and economic 
growth 
Spanish 
national and 
regional 
data, 1980-
1997 
Calibration of 
growth model that 
accounts for tax 
decentralization 
An increase in the level of tax 
decentralisation in the Spanish 
economy compared to the level 
existing in the 
taken period would result in 
economic growth. 
 
Carrion-i-
Silvestre, 
Espasa and 
Mora (2008) 
Contribution of 
fiscal 
decentralization 
to economic 
growth 
Spanish 
Regional 
Data, 1964-
2000 
Panel Data model 
estimated by GMM 
For the regions with higher level of 
competencies, fiscal 
decentralization has positive and 
significant effects on economic 
growth, but fiscal decentralization 
has negative effects on the regions 
with lower level of competencies. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The impact and efficiency of the Structural Actions carried over by the European Union  
in order to enhance sustainable development in European Regions may depend of the 
level of fiscal federalism of the Member States. In this paper, we address the particular 
case of the Actions designed to enhance Public Investment in key areas for growth.  
 
Spain have experienced a process of fiscal decentralization in the recent years and, 
simultaneously, has been recipient of an important share of the Structural Actions. Due 
to the heterogeneous level of economic development and also to the diverse political 
status of Spanish regions, both policies have affected them in an asymmetric way. These 
conditions make Spanish regions the perfect benchmark in order to analyze the role of 
fiscal decentralization on the mechanisms driving the Structural Actions.  
 
We test whether the impact of the European Union Structural Funds (EUSF) on Public 
Investment at the regional level is affected by the level of fiscal autonomy of the 
recipient government. For this purpose, we build and estimate a panel data model in 
which Public Investment is the dependent variable and the EUSF is among the set of 
explanatory variable. We use Spanish data at the regional level for the period 1993-
2007. 
 
In order to capture the role of fiscal decentralization, our first exercise is to break the 
sample into sub-groups with similar levels of fiscal decentralization among them. By 
comparing the different estimates we are able to identify whether the level of fiscal 
autonomy determines the impact of the EUSF on Public Investment. We first separate 
these regions with have a higher level of autonomy recognized on the Spanish 
Constitution –and experience de facto larger autonomy- with the remaining regions. The 
estimates reveal that the impact of EUSF is significant for the groups with lower level 
of fiscal autonomy and not for the others. Then, taking advantage of the fact that fiscal 
decentralization in Spain is an ongoing process, we split the sample into two sub-
periods (1993-1999 and 2000-2007) in which all regions experienced heterogeneous but 
stable over time levels of fiscal autonomy. The results confirm the previous findings 
and the coefficients estimated for EUSF in the first subperiod –in which all regions 
experienced a lower level of fiscal autonomy- were larger and with stronger levels of 
significance in comparison to the ones estimated for the period 2000-2007. 
 
Secondly, we construct a model that we estimate for the entire sample, in which we 
introduce a measure of Fiscal Decentralization (DEC) as well as an interaction term of 
both variables (DEC and EUSF) among the set of explanatory. The purpose is that the 
interaction term captures the join effect of both variables in Public Investment. We 
estimate a negative coefficient attached to the interaction term, this meaning that an the 
effect of one of the variables on the Public Investment depends, negatively, on the value 
of the other.  
 
Finally, we construct a simultaneous equation model in which Public Investment and 
EUSF are decided simultaneously and each one is a determinant of the other. This 
model will allow us to identify the extent to which Public Investment may also be a 
determinant of the allocation of Structural Funds as well as the role of Fiscal 
Decentralization (DEC) on the process of allocating funds across regions. In fact, we 
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conclude that, although to a minor extend, the decision of the regional government of 
investing may also determine the amount of EUSF allocated to it on that year. We also 
estimate that DEC is a negative determinant of EUSF, meaning that regions with larger 
fiscal autonomy –being equal the level of public investment- will receive less Funds. 
This situation may be induced by the larger dispersion of the policy areas in which these 
regions decide their investment. Many of these “new” policy areas may be not eligible 
for the Funds. Of course, there may be other interpretations of this negative coefficient 
estimated, but always under the premise that regions with larger level of fiscal 
autonomy find less incentives to increase their investment through the Structural 
Actions. 
 
The main conclusion of the paper is, therefore, related to the fact that the optimal design 
of the Structural Actions should internalize the extremely heterogeneous levels of fiscal 
federalism that we observe across the Member States. In particular, after the recent 
enlargements of the European Union, we observe a great degree of heterogeneity in the 
design of the regional sector across countries, with extremely different levels of fiscal 
federalism and allocation of competencies. The Structural Actions are now able to 
respond to this heterogeneity only under the condition that they may be allocated either 
to national or sub-national levels of administration. However, the rules governing the 
Funds are equal in all cases, and we can show that, at least with respect to the level of 
efficiency of the Funds, the fiscal autonomy of the recipient government makes a 
difference.  
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List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Variables and sources of data 
Variable Label Definition Units Source 
Public 
Investment PubInv 
Gross fixed capital formation in the 
Regional Government  %GDP 
Badespe database 
(Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales, 
Ministry of 
Economy) 
EU Structural 
Funds EUSF 
EU expenditure executed 
corresponding to Structural funds, by 
Member State. 
%GDP 
Liquidación de 
Presupuestos de las 
CC AA, Ministry of 
Economy 
Public 
Consumption PCons 
Public Current expenditure in the 
Regional Government  
 
%GDP Badespe database 
Private 
Investment PrivInv 
Investment of tangible and intangible 
assets  in the private sector 
 
%GDP 
IVIE (Valencian 
Institute of 
Economic Research) 
Central 
Government 
Investmeng 
CGInv 
Public investment from the central 
government disaggregated at the 
regional level 
%GDP 
1984-1999 IVIE 
2000-2007 PGE 
(General Public 
Budget) 
GDP growth GDPgr Real GDP growth Growth rate 
INE (National 
Statistical Office) 
Population 
growth Popgr  Population in miles persons  
Growth 
rate Eurostat 
Fiscal 
Decentralization DEC 
Ratio of per capital public expenditure 
of the regional government to per 
capital public expenditure of the 
central government  
Ratio 
Badespe database 
(Eurostat for 
population) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PubInv 255 0.0285 0.012 0.0054 0.0586 
EUSF 255 0.0054 0.005 0.0000 0.0307 
PCons 255 0.1011 0.048 0.0144 0.2213 
PrivInv 255 0.2335 0.043 0.1404 0.3702 
CGInvest 255 0.0180 0.010 0.0017 0.0681 
GDPgr 255 0.0735 0.027 0.0152 0.2088 
POPgr 255 0.0083 0.010 -0.0046 0.0383 
DEC 255 0.5700 0.295 0.1055 1.6255 
DEC*EUSF 255 0.0030 0.003 0.0000 0.0164 
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Table 3: Time invariant variables. Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition  Units Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
         
initGDPpc GDP per capita in 1993 
€ 
(10^3) INE 255 9430.85 1688.62 6640.56 12389.48 
Pubcapst9
3 
Stock of public 
capital in 1993 
€ 
(10^3) 
FBBVA
-Ivie 255 7235480 5458365 1268752 21600000 
Privcapst9
3 
Stock of private 
capital in 1993 
€ 
(10^3) 
FBBVA
-Ivie 255 42900000 38800000 4980675 142000000 
PobAct93 working aged population 
People 
(10^3) IVIE 255 1833.97 1547.83 210.55 5374.87 
educ93 
Average years 
of schooling in 
working aged 
population 
years IVIE 255 7.4488 0.5597 6.5000 8.4800 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics. Country-level data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
PubInv 249 0.0274 0.0092 0.007 0.055 
EUSF 240 0.0053 0.0079 0.000 0.037 
PCons 249 0.4546 0.0711 0.280 0.680 
PrivInv 248 0.1764 0.0260 0.113 0.272 
CGInvest 238 0.0522 0.0480 -0.165 0.248 
GDPgr 225 0.0055 0.0046 -0.001 0.024 
POPgr 249 -0.0194 0.0354 -0.134 0.069 
Surplus 249 0.0274 0.0092 0.007 0.055 
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Table 5: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Regions with different levels of Autonomy 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions with low level of competencies (art. 151) Regions with high level of competencies (art.143) 
         
 F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)   0.5081*** 0.4679***   0.6888*** 0.7257*** 
   [0.080] [0.077]   [0.080] [0.071] 
eusf 0.5913*** 0.5981*** 0.6366*** 0.5858*** 0.0176 0.0092 0.3573* 0.2690 
 [0.143] [0.142] [0.156] [0.152] [0.184] [0.178] [0.217] [0.219] 
PubCons 0.0647*** 0.0526** 0.0732** 0.0693*** 0.0451 0.0533 0.1075 0.1102* 
 [0.023] [0.021] [0.028] [0.027] [0.054] [0.048] [0.071] [0.061] 
PrivInv 0.0820*** 0.0782*** 0.0847*** 0.0815*** 0.0656*** 0.0624*** 0.0611*** 0.0623*** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.025] [0.025] [0.019] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] 
CGInvest -0.0322  0.0280  -0.1112  -0.0215  
 [0.066]  [0.074]  [0.124]  [0.131]  
GDPgr -0.0131  -0.0270*  -0.0031  -0.0121  
 [0.012]  [0.016]  [0.009]  [0.013]  
POPgr -0.1418  -0.1138  0.0235  0.0285  
 [0.120]  [0.140]  [0.113]  [0.112]  
F test group  4.33 (.001) 7.26 (.000)   6.15 (.000) 6.78   (.000)   
R2 within 0.321 0.3092   0.152 0.1502   
D-W = .7933 D-W = .7951 AB(1) -2.67(.00) AB(1) -2.65 (.00) D-W  = .6732 D-W = .5007 AB(1) -1.97 (.04) AB(1) -1.96 (.04) Autocorr. Test B-W = .9651 B-W = .9639 AB(2) 1.18 (.23) AB(2) 1.38 (.16) B-W= 1.0279 B-W= .8483 AB(2) 0.76 (.44) AB(2) 0.17 (.86)  
Sargan test   94.743 97.339   75.742 78.676 
stat   0.77 0.75   0.35 0.39 
Obs (groups) 140 (10) 140 (10) 130 (10) 130 (10) 98 (7) 98 (7) 91 (7) 91 (7) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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Table 6: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Time-Evolution 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 1993-1999 2000-2007 
         
 F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)   0.4551*** 0.3934***   0.1643 0.0831955 
   [0.108] [0.096]   [0.115] [0.107] 
eusf 0.5886*** 0.5884*** 0.7426*** 0.4373** 0.0851 0.1854 0.0316 0.0562522 
 [0.165] [0.161] [0.237] [0.222] [0.220] [0.215] [0.236] [0.244] 
PubCons 0.0929* 0.1021** 0.0907 0.1182* 0.0232 0.0338 0.1027** 0.0947564 
 [0.047] [0.044] [0.068] [0.069] [0.035] [0.034] [0.047] [0.037] 
PrivInv 0.0669** 0.0705*** 0.0467 0.0628* 0.0623** 0.0619** 0.1199*** 0.1281358 
 [0.028] [0.025] [0.037] [0.032] [0.024] [0.024] [0.041] [0.037] 
CGInvest -0.0148  0.1040  -0.1555*  -0.00038  
 [0.130]  [0.180]  [0.081]  [0.123]  
GDPgr -0.0072  -0.0349***  -0.0051  0.0166  
 [0.008]  [0.013]  [0.040]  [0.048]  
POPgr 0.0167  -0.4982  -0.1063  -0.1841  
 [0.252]  [0.463]  [0.120]  [0.176]  
F test group 3.52  (.000) 3.73   (.000)   9.79 (.000) 14.21 (.000)   
R2 within 0.3059 0.2973   0.142 0.0997   
D-W = .9509 D-W = .8448 AB(1)-2.26 (.02) AB(1)-2.04 (.04) D-W = 1.227 D-W = 1.175 AB(1)-2.20 (.02) AB(1)-2.38 (.01) Autocorr. Test B-W = 1.350 B-W = 1.264 AB(2) -.065 (.94) AB(2) -.491 (.62) B-W = 1.553 B-W = 1.491 AB(2) .566 (.57) AB(2) .851 (.39) 
Sargan test   27.128 31.83   61.767 64.890 
stat   0.98 0.74   -0.48 0.16 
Obs (groups) 102 (17) 102 (17) 85 (17) 85 (17) 119 (17) 119 (17) 102 (17) 102 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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Table 7: The impact of Structural Actions on Public. 15 oldest Member States 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
 F-E F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)    0.6570*** 0.6282*** 0.6008*** 
    [0.059] [0.062] [0.064] 
EUSF 0.0166 0.0464 0.0665 0.0713 0.1197 0.1465 
 [0.121] [0.120] [0.118] [0.129] [0.128] [0.126] 
Pubcon -0.0051   0.00031   
 [0.016]   [0.019]   
surplus  -0.0324** -0.0314**  -0.0376** -0.0425*** 
  [0.015] [0.014]  [0.016] [0.016] 
PrivInv -0.0751*** -0.0511* -0.0491* -0.0762*** -0.0502* -0.0361 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] 
gdpgr -0.0041 -0.0044  -0.0066 -0.0073  
 [0.005] [0.005]  [0.007] [0.006]  
popgr 0.3112* 0.3104* 0.3007* -0.0827 -0.1363 -0.1847 
 [0.180] [0.175] [0.174] [0.234] [0.234] [0.232] 
F test group 2.09 (0.0689) 3.02 (0.0122) 3.56 (0.0079)    
R2 within 0.0531 0.0750 0.0702    
.63365568 .7401 .7274 -2.011 (.04) -2.113 (.03) -2.039 (.04) | Autocorr. Test .85706886 .9428 .9447 0.889 (.37) 1.366 (.17) 1.387 (.16) 
Sargan test    167.54 163.05 161.94 
stat    0.495 0.593 0.617 
Obs (groups) 206 (15) 206 (15) 208 (15) 191 (15) 191 (15) 193 (15) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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Table 8: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Interaction Term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 F-E F-E F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)     0.5881*** 0.5807*** 0.5366*** 0.5400*** 
     [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] 
eusf 0.6482*** 0.6895*** 0.6477*** 0.6757*** 0.7860*** 0.7898*** 0.5452** 0.5262** 
 [0.19] [0.18] [0.19] [0.18] [0.22] [0.20] [0.22] [0.21] 
dec 0.0189** 0.0173*** 0.0164*** 0.0154*** 0.0222*** 0.0208*** 0.0169*** 0.0167*** 
 [0.004] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
dec*eusf -0.5612* -0.6267* -0.5269 -0.5732* -0.7154* -0.7325** -0.5390 -0.4977 
 [0.338] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.37] [0.34] [0.36] [0.35] 
PrivInv 0.0462*** 0.0475*** 0.0444*** 0.0456*** 0.0492*** 0.0508*** 0.0594***  
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]  
PubCons -0.0198  -0.0134  -0.0169  0.00073 0.0608*** 
 [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03] [0.02] 
CGInvest -0.0177 -0.0203   0.0432 0.0427   
 [0.05] [0.05]   [0.06] [0.06]   
GDPgr -0.0129* -0.0119*   -0.0263*** -0.0247***   
 [0.01] [0.01]   [0.01] [0.01]   
POPgr -0.1606* -0.1629**   -0.1253 -0.1273   
 [0.08] [0.08]   [0.09] [0.09]   
F test group 5.93 (.000) 5.76 (.000) 7.80 (.000) 7.54 (.000)     
R2 within 0.3014 0.297 0.2743 0.2699     
D-W = .654 D-W = .618 D-W = .652 D-W = .612 AB(1) -3.13 (.00) AB(1)-3.10 (.00) AB(1)-3.05 (.00) AB(1)-3.02 (.00) AR Test B-W = .896 B-W = .860 B-W = .902 B-W = .866 AB(2) .858 (.39) AB(2) .891 (.37) AB(2) .526 (.59) AB(2) .519 (.60) 
Sargan test     173.888 174.296 168.892 169.070 
stat     0.63 0.65 0.71 0.67 
Obs (groups) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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Table 9: The impact of Structural Actions on Regional Public Investment. Centered Interaction Term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 F-E F-E F-E F-E GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB GMM-AB 
PubInv (t-1)     0.5796*** 0.5775*** 0.5401*** 0.5424*** 
     [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] 
eusf 0.6482*** 0.6894*** 0.6477*** 0.6757*** 0.7500*** 0.7746*** 0.5433** 0.5446** 
 [0.19] [0.18] [0.19] [0.18] [0.22] [0.20] [0.22] [0.22] 
dec 0.0189*** 0.0173*** 0.0164*** 0.0154*** 0.0218*** 0.0208*** 0.0169*** 0.0172*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
dec*eusf -0.5612* -0.6266* -0.5269 -0.5731* -0.6856* -0.7210** -0.5279 -0.5359 
 [0.34] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.37] [0.34] [0.36] [0.35] 
PrivInv 0.0462*** 0.0475*** 0.0444*** 0.0456*** 0.0484*** 0.0497*** 0.0556*** 0.0559*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
PubCons -0.0198  -0.0134  -0.0143  0.0018  
 [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  [0.03]  
CGInvest -0.0177 -0.0203   0.0426 0.0424   
 [0.05] [0.05]   [0.06] [0.06]   
GDPgr -0.0129* -0.0119*   -0.0246** -0.0239**   
 [0.01] [0.01]   [0.01] [0.01]   
POPgr -0.1605* -0.1629**   -0.1249 -0.1279   
 [0.08] [0.08]   0.09 0.09   
F test group 4.86 (.000) 4.63 (.000) 6.06 (.000) 5.76 (.000)     
R2 within 0.30 0.297 0.2743 0.2699     
D-W = .654 D-W = .618 D-W = .652 D-W = .612 AB(1) -3.11 (0.00) AB(1) -3.10 (.00) AB(1) -3.10 (.00) AB(1) -3.04 (.00) AR Test B-W = .896 B-W = .860 B-W = .902 B-W = .866 AB(2) .846 (.39) AB(2) .891 (.37) AB(2) .876 (.38) AB(2) .541 (.58) 
Sargan test     173.921 174.45 171.060 170.784 
stat     0.63 0.64 0.67 0.64 
Obs (groups) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 238 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 221 (17) 
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
Ab(order) denotes Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the error term 
D-W: modified Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelated errors; B-W: Baltagi Wu LBI 
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 Table 10: Regional Public Investment and EU Structural Funds. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogenous” error term 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 PubInv eusf 
 EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS 
eusf 1.4957*** 1.3570 1.4913*** 0.0176     
 [0.481] [0.987] [0.335] [0.815]     
PubInv     0.2040*** 0.1104*** 0.1737*** 0.1042*** 
     [0.027] [0.032] [0.028] [0.032] 
dec 0.0099** 0.0094** 0.0168*** 0.0157*** -0.0043*** -0.00074 -0.0032*** -0.00184** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.00] 
PubCons 0.0481** 0.0494**   0.0035 -0.0105   
 [0.020] [0.022]   [0.008] [0.008]   
PrivInv 0.0353** 0.0341* 0.0276* 0.0130     
 [0.016] [0.019] [0.015] [0.017]     
GDPgr -0.0237* -0.0225*       
 [0.013] [0.014]       
POPgr -0.2170*** -0.2050** -0.2530*** -0.1906**     
 [0.075] [0.081] [0.072] [0.078]     
CGInvest     -0.0053 -0.0479* -0.0194 -0.0486* 
     [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] 
RMSE 0.1712 0.1774 0.2208 0.2287 0.1981 0.2052 0.2277 0.2359 
         
Obs (groups) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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Table 11: Regional Public Investment and EU Structural Funds. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogenous” individual effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 PubInv eusf 
 HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- 
eusf 0.5933*** 0.5648*** 0.5433*** 0.5313***     
 [0.137] [0.136] [0.137] [0.137]     
PubInv     0.1055*** 0.1053*** 0.1002*** 0.1002*** 
     [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
dec 0.00993*** 0.0099*** 0.0162*** 0.0160*** -0.000691 -0.00068 -0.00178** -0.0017** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
PubCons 0.04267** 0.0425**   -0.0104 -0.0102   
 [0.019] [0.019]   [0.008] [0.008]   
PrivInv 0.02823* 0.0258* 0.0178** 0.0176     
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]     
GDPgr -0.01847 -0.0181       
 [0.012] [0.012]       
POPgr -0.1957*** -0.1847** -0.2108* -0.2058***     
 [0.073] [0.072] [0.072] [0.072]     
CGInvest     -0.0476** -0.0483* -0.0489* -0.0489** 
     [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] 0.025 
RMSE 0.1729 0.1769 0.2230 0.2282 0.2000 0.2047 0.2300 0.2353 
         
Obs (groups) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 255 (17) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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Table 12: Public Investment and EUSF. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogenous” error term. Regions by level of autonomy 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions 151 Regions 143 
Dependent var. PubInv eusf PubInv eusf 
 EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS EC 2SLS FE 2SLS 
         
eusf 1.7222*** 3.1396**   0.8766 -2.399*   
 [0.196] [1.263]   [0.616] [1.241]   
PubInv   0.2801*** 0.2008***   0.0659* -0.0213 
   [0.038] [0.046]   [0.036] [0.041] 
dec 0.0164*** 0.0174*** -0.0052*** -0.0037*** 0.0102** 0.0074 -0.0027** -0.0014 
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] 
PrivInv 0.0541** 0.0791**   0.0102 -0.0021   
 [0.022] [0.034]   [0.023] [0.026]   
POPgr -0.2521*** -0.3949*   -0.2485** -0.3638***   
 [0.080] [0.206]   [0.115] [0.134]   
CGInvest   -0.0114 -0.0317   0.0331 -0.0438 
   [0.030] [0.031]   [0.048] [0.049] 
RMSE 0.2008 0.2081 0.2012 0.2084 0.2506 0.2598 0.2639 0.2736 
Obs (groups) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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Table 13: Public Investment and EUSF. Simultaneous Equations. “Endogenous” individual effects. Regions by level of autonomy 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 Regions 151 Regions 143 
 HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- HT 2SLS FE- 
Dependent var. PubInv eusf PubInv eusf 
eusf 0.7318*** 0.7328***   -0.4670* -0.4514   
 [0.149] [0.147]   [0.272] [0.275]   
PubInv   0.1820*** 0.1820***   -0.0381 -0.0381 
   [0.044] [0.043   [0.037] [.037] 
dec 0.0127*** 0.0127*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 0.0083** 0.0071 -0.0014 -0.0014 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] 
PrivInv 0.0628*** 0.0630***   0.0036 0.0072   
 [0.020] [0.019]   [0.019] [0.021]   
POPgr -0.1473 -0.1479   -0.2854*** -0.2675***   
 [0.096] [0.094]   [0.090] [0.098]   
CGInvest   -0.0345 -0.0345   -0.0412 -0.0412 
   [0.031] [0.031]   [0.048] [0.049] 
RMSE 0.2043 0.21021811 0.2047 0.2077 0.2571 0.2585 0.2707 0.2721 
Obs (groups) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 150 (10) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 105 (7) 
         
*,**,*** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
Standard errors within brackets 
RMSE: Root Mean Square Errors 
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